How would Poilievre and Carney have voted in the U.S. Presidential Election?
How a subtle distinction in how people answer this question could lead to vastly a vastly different election outcome.
Imagine, for a moment, that Justin Trudeau, Pierre Poilievre, Jagmeet Singh, Elizabeth May, and Mark Carney all had a ballot in the 2024 U.S. Presidential election. Who would they have voted for—Donald Trump or Kamala Harris?
This was one of the more unconventional questions we asked 1,000 Canadian adults in a national Abacus Data survey conducted from February 27 to March 1, 2025, and the results paint a striking picture of how Canadians perceive each figure. I think the question helps us understand what people think about each leader and whether they cheered for Trump or Harris to win and the implications for how they might vote or think about those choices now.
Trudeau, Singh, May, and Carney were seen as clear Harris supporters: large numbers of respondents leaned toward them aligning with the Democratic side, and relatively few thought any of them were in Trump’s camp.
When it came to Conservative Leader Pierre Poilievre, however, over half of Canadians believed he would have supported Trump. But there’s an important nuance in how that support is perceived: 31% believed Poilievre would have strongly backed Trump, while another 24% thought he would only somewhat support him. That distinction—“strongly” versus “somewhat”—turned out to be a critical lens through which this association is related to other views or intended behaviours.
Despite the distance between Canada and the U.S., Donald Trump’s legacy remains powerful. His threats of tariffs and constant musings about annexation are seared into Canadian public consciousness, and he remains deeply and broadly disliked among Canadians. Being likened to Trump—or even somewhat associated with him—can be a mixed bag for a Canadian politician, but being cast as a “strong Trump supporter” is a harder sell still.
The data show that those who believe Poilievre would have strongly voted Trump are far less likely to view him positively and far more likely to say they would not even consider voting for the Conservative Party under his leadership. It’s as if they see Poilievre as a carbon copy of all the qualities they despise in Trump but worse, that he was supportive of someone who threaten Canada’s interests so severely.
By contrast, the group who only see Poilievre as “somewhat” supportive of Trump tend to find him much more palatable. They’re more willing to vote Conservative and more likely to trust Poilievre’s willingness to push back if U.S. policies harm Canada.
This dovetails with how perceptions about Poilievre’s stance on Trump intersect with broader voting intentions. Among Canadians who feel he’d strongly support Trump, many lean Liberal or NDP, effectively ruling out Poilievre as an option. The notion of a full-throated Trump endorsement raises alarm bells about whether Poilievre would truly defend Canadian interests in potential trade disputes or security matters.
Meanwhile, the respondents who think Poilievre is only somewhat supportive of Trump split quite differently, with a majority leaning to the Conservatives. In some ways, these Canadians may share Poilievre’s broader critique of “elites” or economic grievances without concluding he’s an ideological twin of Trump.
And yet, it’s also true that a sizeable portion of Conservative Party supporters hold favourable views of Donald Trump.” For these Canadians, seeing Poilievre strongly tied to Trump can reinforce their support, endearing Poilievre to them precisely because it signals a shared populist ethos that’s anti-elite, unafraid of controversy, and ready to upend the status quo. In that sense, the same Trump link that repels some segments of the electorate can simultaneously energize a dedicated core within the Conservative base. This is Poilievre’s fundamental dilemna. Both groups are too big to antognize and risk alienating.
This distinction between “strongly” and “somewhat” is also evident when we ask Canadians, “Who would you trust to handle Donald Trump if he became President again?” Among those convinced Poilievre is firmly in Trump’s camp, Justin Trudeau is seen as the safer bet by a clear margin. The sentiment is clear: if you think Poilievre and Trump are on the same page, you can’t really imagine Poilievre pushing back on tariffs or annexation rhetoric and you may even question his judgement for supporting someone like Trump. But with those who assume Poilievre is more nuanced—someone who may share some of Trump’s populist instincts but is still loyal to Canadian interests—Poilievre competes more evenly.
The issue becomes even more pronounced for Canadians who rate “Donald Trump and his administration” as a top concern (about 4 in 10 Canadians). The more people worry about Trump’s impact on their lives and Canada as a whole, the more likely they are to seek a leader they trust to stand up to him and deal with implications of his descisions. If you believe Poilievre strongly supported Trump, it’s tough to see him as a staunch protector of Canadian sovereignty. Only 16% of Canadians who rated Trump as one of their top issues and believe Poilievre would have strongly support Trump think the Conservatives are best able to deal with Trump. If Trump becomes more salient and more clearly defines the choice voters are making and more Canadians think Poilievre strongly supported him, then Poilievre could be in real trouble. But if you think he’s only partially sympathetic, some voters can buy the argument that Poilievre might actually be the stronger negotiator, able to work with the U.S. while still defending Canada’s economic and political interests.
All of this underscores the fact that Trump remains a major wedge in Canadian politics—and that wedge cuts most sharply against Pierre Poilievre. At a time when Poilievre is trying to grow the Conservative base beyond its core, many moderate and independent voters still recoil from Trump’s brand. Even Conservative-leaning voters uncomfortable with Trump’s style will need reassurances that Poilievre is his own man. If that “Poilievre = Trump” perception solidifies—particularly if it’s cast as “strong support”—it could significantly weaken the Conservative leader’s ability to broaden his appeal, especially among swing voters critical to winning power.
This data shows that the nuance of how Poilievre might have cast a hypothetical vote—strongly or just somewhat for Trump—does more than fill in a curious conversation topic. It reveals a fault line in how Canadians view his leadership, his capacity to stand up to a Trump White House, and his credibility as a future prime minister. If Poilievre fails to handle this wedge issue, it could prove to be one of his biggest obstacles in the lead-up to the next federal election. But if he can articulate a vision that places Canadian interests first—conveying, in effect, a “somewhat” rather than “strong” stance—he has a real opportunity to close the gap and reshape perceptions enough to widen the Conservative tent.