Does Poilievre have a Trump problem?
A look at some polling data on the relationship between views of Poilievre and Trump
The inauguration of Donald Trump as President of the United States earlier this week has introduced a renewed sense of uncertainty in Canada–U.S. relations, and it now falls to Canadian political leaders to chart a course through shifting policy terrain.
Chief among the immediate concerns is Trump’s threat to impose a 25% tariff on Canadian imports on February 1, compounded by his ongoing rhetorical suggestion that Canada should become the “51st state.” Such statements, though arguably more symbolic than substantive, could nonetheless disrupt bilateral negotiations and exert pressure on Canadian political actors. Although he’s attempted to take himself out of the dynamic, pressure on Pierre Poilievre will continue to grow in my view.
He faces a distinctive political challenge: he must reconcile the economic and diplomatic imperatives of maintaining a constructive relationship with a newly assertive U.S. administration, while also satisfying the concerns of a sizable contingent of voters who regard Trump as a liability rather than an ally.
Recent Abacus Data polling I did suggest that public perceptions of Poilievre and Trump are intertwined in ways that may influence future electoral outcomes. Although a large proportion of Canadians who hold negative views of Trump also hold negative views of Poilievre, a notable minority—approximately 15% of Canadians—exhibit a positive impression of Poilievre while simultaneously maintaining an unfavorable view of Trump.
This demographic is distributed fairly evenly across the country and by gender, but it is notably older, with 68% of respondents over the age of 45. As a group, they are not merely fence-sitters; 85% would vote Conservative if an election were held today, although at this point they are unlikely to change as only 13% are open to the Liberal Party, and 23% would consider the New Democratic Party. Their inclination toward the Conservative Party appears solid but not unshakeable.
This cohort’s disapproval of Trump stems, at least in part, from a perception that his policies create economic risk for Canada. While a prospective 25% tariff is the most immediate threat, several additional policy directives from the White House may exacerbate tensions.
The new administration’s notice of withdrawal from the Paris climate agreement, for instance, diverges sharply from the direction of the Canadian federal government, which continues to emphasize greenhouse gas reductions and multilateral climate commitments. In conjunction with the temporary blockage of new wind production on the outer continental shelf, along with statements highlighting a general shift toward maximizing fossil fuel production on federal lands, there is the potential for a long-term shift in North American energy markets that could, in turn, affect Canadian exports and green technology investments.
Taken together, these policy moves challenge the efforts of Canadian leaders seeking alignment on climate objectives, since cross-border synergy and shared market frameworks are often prerequisites for achieving large-scale emissions reductions. Notably, many Conservative supporters in Canada, including segments of the 15% group who admire Poilievre but dislike Trump, indicate they believe these U.S. policy changes and proposed tariffs would have a negative impact on Canada—59% regard the tariffs alone as “extremely negative.” Such data underscore the tension that Poilievre faces: he cannot easily celebrate or ignore Trump’s agenda without risking a dissonance between his own supporters’ economic aspirations and their views on international cooperation.
Moreover, Trump’s pronounced isolationist stance may heighten anxieties surrounding bilateral and multilateral collaboration. His directive to withdraw from the World Health Organization, for example, signals a willingness to recast long-standing international partnerships, and it could hamper the kind of cross-border public health initiatives that were vital during the COVID-19 pandemic. Trump’s broader withdrawal from cooperative forums, such as the OECD’s global tax deal, could also alter established arrangements that underpin economic relations with Canada. For Poilievre, who often underscores the importance of trade and business competitiveness, these moves from the White House complicate the message of a strong North American partnership. He must demonstrate opposition to policies that harm Canadian businesses, yet he must also prevent the perception that he is endorsing a combative approach that could escalate the trade standoff.
Poilievre’s strategic position can be situated in the broader context of how allied or neighbouring nations navigate asymmetrical power relationships. The United States, as Canada’s largest trading partner, wields considerable economic leverage, especially when presidential directives target bilateral trade flows. Leaders in Ottawa customarily adopt a balancing strategy: they seek to protect Canada’s interests while maintaining civil relations. Poilievre’s approach, however, is complicated by partisan expectations. He cannot appear too accommodating of Trump’s threats, lest he alienate voters who view Trump as a destabilizing force, yet he cannot seem overly belligerent toward the new administration, given the need to safeguard cross-border economic ties and satisfy a sizeable portion of his own base who likes Trump.
The poll findings highlight the potential fragility of Poilievre’s support among the 15% who appreciate his domestic platform but who may want to see him gravitate toward Trump’s isolationism or protectionism. The risk is that as comparisons between Poilievre and Trump intensify—whether from political opponents or from Canadian media coverage—this segment of voters may begin to question whether Poilievre stands sufficiently apart from Trump’s more controversial stances on trade and sovereignty. Should the Canadian public perceive Poilievre as mirroring Trump’s rhetoric or appearing unwilling to speak out against detrimental policies such as the 25% tariff, there may be a loss of trust that undermines his electoral coalition.
For the Liberal Party, the opportunity lies in drawing a direct line between Poilievre’s brand of conservatism and Trump’s newly assertive and highly visible approach to governance. By highlighting policies like the Paris accord withdrawal, tough immigration policies, and protectionist energy mandates, Liberals could frame Poilievre as either complicit or impotent in confronting these challenges.
In short, the convergence of Trump’s protectionist trade posture with his broader set of nationalist policy initiatives creates a precarious environment for Poilievre and the Conservatives. The 15% of Canadians who like Poilievre yet disapprove of Trump represent a critical fault line within the conservative base: these voters want change in Canada, likely support the low-tax and smaller-government vision espoused by Poilievre, but they harbour skepticism about Trumpism that undermines multilateral cooperation and heightens economic uncertainty.
How Poilievre manages these dual imperatives—remaining steadfast in protecting Canadian interests while affirming the distinctive values of his leadership—could shape not only public perceptions of his party, but also the broader dynamic of Canada–U.S. relations under a Trump presidency.